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Abstract 
Paul Ricoeur’s theory of the narrative constitution of time, and Emile Durkheim’s conception of the 
ritual construction of time, seem, at least on first examination, incommensurable. While their 
important and influential theories of the social constitution of time are not easily harmonised, it is 
possible to construct several bridges between the two, such that they may at least be brought into 
conversation with one another (a dialogue Ricoeur himself seemed keen to avoid). While the two 
theories may contradict one another, if we look at the relationship between ritual and narrative, we 
find unexpected points of possible convergence where bridges may be built.  We find that ritual and 
narrative are themselves not entirely distinct from one another, and even sometimes difficult to 
disentangle. Further, narratives of the past require the calendar (itself owing much to its ritual 
heritage) to provide a structure for, and a way of marking, the flow of time. Conversely, ritual 
practices often act as carriers of narrative, and assisting the transmission of narratives from 
generation to generation.   
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 Paul Ricoeur’s theory of the narrative constitution of time, and Emile Durkheim’s conception of the 
ritual construction of time, seem, at least on first examination, incommensurable. While their 
explanations of the social organisation of time cannot be readily harmonised, it is possible to 
construct several bridges between the two, such that they begin a conversation with one another (a 
dialogue Ricoeur himself seemed keen to avoid). I will suggest that, while the two theories may be 
mutually exclusive, if we look at the relationship between ritual and narrative, we find unexpected 
points where the gap between the two theories of time narrows. 
 In Elementary Forms of the Religious Life and Time and Narrative, Durkheim and Ricoeur 
respectively address fundamentally philosophical questions and provide effectively sociological 
means of addressing them. Although Ricoeur would undoubtedly have objected to the use of 
“sociological” to describe his work, I argue below that we are justified in understanding his approach 
to time and narrative in these terms. While the social relations of the category of time is in many 
ways underdeveloped in Durkheim’s book—he foregrounds class, force, cause and to some degree, 
space—it looms large in the neo- or post-Kantian problematic which he is looking to address and to 
reframe sociologically.   
Durkheim allows no place for narrative in the constitution of time; Ricoeur snubs any interaction 
with Durkheim (and most of those who followed him), countenancing little role for ritual in the 
structure and experience of time.  And yet, there are several crossing over points—fords, if not 
bridges—between the two. This includes the calendar, which is a notable product of the recurring 
tendency to ritualise narrative, and to narrativise ritual. Indeed, thinking through several examples, 
it becomes apparent that, pace Durkheim and Ricoeur both, it may not be possible to entirely 
disentangle ritual from narrative or vice-versa. Thus, while their explanations of social time may be 
mutually exclusive, the key elements in the explanation (ritual and narrative) are in reality deeply 
intertwined. As the examples of the Christian Mass and the Passover Seder that I will discuss show, 
the elements of these important examples of ritual-narratives are like conjoined twins that share a 
heart and cannot be separated.  While one could argue that what really matters is the ritual 
(Durkheim), or conversely, that what is important is the narrative (Ricoeur), and the opposing part is 
incidental, neither move would be well advised.  If we were to extract the narrative from the ritual, 
the ritual seems to lose its stated purpose, which is the remembrance and re-enactment of the 
story.  On the other hand, if we were to attempt to extract the ritual from the narrative, leaving only 
the story, the story itself would lose its means of being told and of being embodied,  as well as its 
means of being passed on to a subsequent generation; each new generation embodies the narrative 
as they consume it ritually.  
Durkheim on ritual and time 
Durkheim sets up his study in Elementary Forms as a response to a long-standing philosophical 
debate with which he hopes to provide a sociological resolution. This is not a minor point, nor is it a 
sideshow in the book—Durkheim contends that the origins of humankind’s fundamental capacity for 
conceptual thought (including about time) derive from religion:  
At the root of our judgements, there are certain fundamental notions that dominate our 
entire intellectual life. It is these ideas that philosophers, beginning with Aristotle, have 
called the categories of understanding: notions of time, space, number cause, substance, 
personality. They correspond to the most universal properties of things. They are like solid 
frames that confine thought. Thought does not seem to be able to break out of them 
without destroying itself, since it seems we cannot think of objects that are not in time or 
space, that cannot be counted, and so forth (Durkheim, 1995: 9). 
Durkheim contends that there are two opposed positions for dealing with the basic epistemological 
question—he designates these as the empiricist and the apriorist and argues that neither approach 
is really adequate (Rawls, 2004).   Whatever Durkheim’s reputation in the discipline he helped to 
found and his fondness (very often misunderstood) for social facts, he has much less sympathy for 
empiricist arguments than for those of the apriorist.  Durkheim observes that what is most 
fundamental about the categories of understanding is their universality.  By contrast, the most basic 
thing about any sense experience is its particularity: it is an immediate experience of this unique 
object.  Durkheim accepts Hume’s argument that there is no way to get from particular sense 
experience to the categories of understanding, which must not only be general, but universal. The 
individual cannot make up the categories out of “bits and pieces” of sense experience (Hart and 
McKinnon, 2010).  One may be able to see that one outcome regularly occurs after a particular 
action, but this cannot confirm that the one caused the other.  Likewise, we may be able to sense 
similarity between objects, but we cannot derive from this the concept a class of objects. Durkheim 
goes so far as to argue that to the extent that we allow particulars to dominate philosophical 
thought, we give up on reason; he suggests, at least half seriously, that empiricism should therefore 
renamed as irrationalism on that account (13). 
Durkheim nevertheless has significant concerns about aspects of the apriorist position, and this sets 
him apart from those who have understood his position as straightforwardly Kantian (Rose, 2009; 
Hall, 2007:22).  Durkheim worries that apriorists grant “to the intellect a certain power to transcend 
experience… without explanation or warrant” (14). While warrant indicates a philosophical concern, 
“explanation” is here the more significant criticism, because for the apriorists nothing is prior to the 
categories, and no experience is possible without them.  Durkheim sees a basically theological 
impetus in the apriorists, whereby a “mystic participation” allows individuals to partake of the 
“divine reason” which underpins such a “marvellous faculty” (15).  
Both the empiricists and the apriorists treat perception, and hence the categories which inform or 
can be constructed from it, as the processes and structures of an individual’s perception.   Durkheim 
is convinced that his research has shown the categories to be of social origin, and this distinguishes 
his own approach from both apriorism and empiricism. It also allows him to capitalise on the 
strengths of the two, otherwise incommensurable, approaches.  Durkheim maintains the verity of 
the empiricist’s sense perception and the apriorist’s categories as distinct “levels”, corresponding to 
the individual (empiricism) and to society (apriorism), which he believes reflects the duality of 
human nature he refers to as homo duplex (14-15). 
In addition to arguing that social relations are prior to the apriori categories, Durkheim distinguishes 
himself from Kant and his followers. He argues that for apriorism, the categories are the condition of 
any and all experience of the world; Durkheim himself contends, however, that individuals do have 
sense experience, though it is inchoate, pre-conceptual, non-rational, and cannot be shared with 
others. The ability to share one’s perceptions of the world with others accounts for the social 
necessity of the categories, as Durkheim argues in the conclusion (1995: 435). These provide the 
framework for communication and coordinated action, and they are able to provide such an 
infrastructure because they are also the product of society. Echoing some of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
early arguments (McKinnon, 2012; 2014) Durkheim contends that the categories are metaphors that 
translate the social organization of the group into categories that its members use to understand the 
world (1995:15). 
While time is a category of considerable theoretical importance to his argument, Durkheim devotes 
considerably less attention to time than he does to class, force or cause.   Nevertheless, Durkheim 
identifies the same basic problem in empiricist understandings of time that Ricoeur will identify with 
the phenomenology of time in Time and Narrative, when he writes (1995:9): 
…what if one tried to imagine what the notion of time would be in the absence of the 
methods we use to divide, measure, and express it with objective signs, a time that was not 
a succession of years, months, weeks, days, and hours? It would be nearly impossible to 
conceive of. We can conceive of time only if we differentiate between moments. Now what 
is the origin of that differentiation?  
Durkheim shows that he is familiar with Augustine’s famous reflection on time, where the writer of 
late antiquity tries to grasp the essence of time by means of recollection and expectancy.  However 
important such an exercise might be for “our personal experience” it is an inadequate basis for 
conceptualising time. To grasp the category of time, one must escape the prison of solipsism. Thus: 
The category of time is not simply a partial or complete commemoration of our lived life. It is 
an abstract and impersonal framework that contains not only our individual existence but 
also that of humanity. It is like an endless canvas on which duration is spread out before the 
mind’s eye and on which all possible events are located in relation to points of reference 
that are fixed and specified. It is not my time that is organised in this way; it is time that is 
conceived of objectively by all men of the same civilization. This by itself is enough to make 
us begin to see that any such organisation would have to be collective. And indeed, 
observation establishes that these indispensable points, in reference to which all things are 
arranged temporally, are taken from social life.  The division into days, weeks, months, 
years, etc., corresponds to the recurrence of rites, festivals, and public ceremonies at regular 
intervals. A calendar expresses the rhythm of collective activity while ensuring that 
regularity (10). 
Thus, Durkheim treats the calendar as providing hints of the organisation of time as a social product. 
This takes on added significance when he gets into the heart of the empirical analysis of “the 
principal modes of ritual conduct” in section three, chapters one (the negative cult) and two (the 
positive cult, part i), where he discovers the social practices of sacred and profane as the foundation 
of the calendar. The negative cult establishes the relationship between Durkheim’s conception of 
the sacred and the categories of time and space, and the positive cult establishes the connection 
between collective effervescence and the categories of time and space. Between the two, this takes 
us to the heart of Durkheim’s argument.  
Durkheim argues that the absolute separation between sacred and profane is both universal and, 
collectively experienced, it is the essence of religion1.  What he terms the “negative cult” are those 
ritualised processes that distinguish “all that is sacred from all that is profane” (306); the way this 
separation is constructed and maintained is the foundation for the categories of both space and 
time, which he discusses together as articulated categories. The negative cult does not simply reflect 
the sacred but “implements” (1995: 306; “réaliser” 1960:431) it. The negative cult provides the ritual 
institution of the division between sacred and profane; the boundary to sacred space is marked by 
rituals that both show respect, but these also ensure safe passage from profane to sacred, as well as 
back again to profane.  So also is the distinction between sacred time and profane time is marked 
liturgically:  
Likewise religious and profane life cannot coexist at the same time. In consequence, 
religious life must have specified days or periods assigned to it from which all profane 
occupations are withdrawn. Thus were holy days born.  There is no religion, and hence no 
society, that has not known and practiced this division of time into two distinct parts that 
alternate with one another according to a principle that varies with peoples and civilizations. 
In fact, probably the necessity of that alternation led men to insert distinctions and 
differentiations into the homogeneity and continuity that it does not naturally have (313). 
The first, and primary distinction made between kinds of time is between sacred time and profane 
time, and the two must be kept apart by the observation of prohibitions and rituals. Profane 
activities (such as, for example, work) is prohibited on sacred days, allowing sacred and profane to 
avoid all “contact” with one another. The beginning and end of sacred time are often marked with 
rituals, drawing a boundary in time, akin to the border created in space.   
 When Durkheim talks about the “positive cult” these two things come together. There is a world of 
difference between the experience of profane time, where the group is scattered and preoccupied 
with mundane, economic endeavours, and those seasons when the group gathers. In gathering, the 
group generates energy from shared proximity and common focus on the ideals of the group in an 
experience of collective effervescence.  “We know,” says Durkheim: 
That the positive cult tends naturally to take on periodic forms; this is one of its 
distinguishing traits…The essence of the cult is the cycle of feasts that are regularly repeated 
at definite times. We are now in a position to understand where the impulse toward 
periodicity comes from. The rhythm that religious life obeys only expresses, and results 
from, the rhythm of social life (353).  
While it is not possible to gather all the time—profane labours mean that there is food to eat and 
shelter in which to dwell—but the social group needs to revive itself periodically, to renew its 
awareness of itself and reaffirm its commonality.  Such periodic gatherings have often, Durkheim 
notes, been seasonal, as they were with some of the aboriginal groups in his study, but while that is 
common feature of religious rituals as well as an enduring tendency, this is a “purely eternal” factor. 
This seems somewhat over-stating his case for the sake of consistency, as we will discuss following 
                                                          
1 This is by no means an uncontroversial claim (McKinnon, 2002); the argument I am developing here does not 
require that we accept that the distinction between sacred and profane, or the category of religion, is 
universal. These are themselves distinct claims which need to be evaluated separately (Lynch, 2012). 
an examination of Ricoeur’s alternate position on the social organisation of time, as we talk about 
how we might be able to think with Ricoeur and Durkheim together.  
  
Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Social Time 
Paul Ricoeur’s magisterial three volume Time and Narrative begins with a somewhat different 
problematic than does Durkheim’s Elementary Forms, though the two are not unrelated.  Of the 
parallels, Ricoeur seems—possibly willfully—unaware; he relegates the contribution of Durkheim on 
the concept of time to two footnotes. The first simply provides a list of relevant references in the 
Durkheimian tradition. The second relegates Durkheim and the Durkheimians to a “genealogical” 
approach to the question of the calendar, more concerned with the social origin of the calendar than 
its “significance”. Ricoeur’s dismissive gesture is significant in itself, even if the substantial point by 
which Ricoeur dispatches Durkheim is distinctly out of character for Ricoeur, whose writing is 
typically thoughtful, generous and synthetic. 
 As Stanislas Deprez (2015) has demonstrated in compelling detail, Ricoeur has long evaded close 
encounters with sociology—especially French sociology—and his work shows a striking lack of 
reference in particular to the two dominant sociological intellects of twentieth century France, 
Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu2.  By contrast, he seems more receptive of the work of Max Weber.  
This avoidance of the work of the French thinkers may stem from his concerns about sociological 
holism—though this would apply more to Durkheim than to Bourdieu—or from a concern that 
sociological explanation could undermine his commitment to individual moral responsibility. His 
work on time nevertheless has a much greater affinity with Durkheim’s social time than Ricoeur was 
prepared to admit. 
Ricoeur was one of the most important French philosophers from the end of the Second World War 
until his death in 2005. He was particularly interested in the philosophy of religion (cf. Ricoeur, 
1995), and held a post for fifteen years (1970-1985) in the Divinity School at the University of 
Chicago (Dosse, 2008). In this paper, however, my focus is his magisterial three volume Time and 
Narrative (1984; 1985; and 1988), which some have suggested is the most important philosophical 
examination ever conducted into either time or narrative (Dowling, 2011).  Sociologists have tended 
to repay Ricoeur’s lack of attentiveness to their enterprise like for like. With the exception of medical 
sociology, which has adopted his notion of narrative identity as part of its theoretical toolkit, largely 
appropriated, in second, or third,-hand bowdlerisations (but see Ezzy, 1998), the discipline has, by 
and large, ignored Ricoeur’s work, and in particular his analysis of narrative. The last major 
monograph on Ricoeur’s work by a sociologist antedated most of his work on narrative (Thompson, 
1981a), as does the anthology of Ricoeur’s writings most likely to be consulted by social scientists, 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Ricoeur, 1981).  The result is that a common frame of 
reference is often missing, though this may be showing signs of changing in the recent appropriation 
of Ricoeur’s work in post-Bourdieusian French sociology (Truc, 2011). 
                                                          
2 Maurice Halbwachs and Raymond Aron are partial exceptions: Halbwachs work on collective memory 
occupies an important place in Memory, History, Forgetting (2005);  Aron appears largely as an interpreter of 
Weber, or as an historian than as a sociologist 
Ricoeur’s primary concern in Time and Narrative is to address a series of fundamental problems in 
the philosophy of time. Ricoeur shows that there is an antinomy at the heart of all previous 
philosophy of time in western thought since (late-) antiquity, with its two basic and competing 
approaches to time, the objective (or cosmological) and the subjective (or phenomenological). The 
first position stems from Aristotle, and treats time as an objective, natural phenomenon, marked for 
example by the movement of the sun and moon and planets. The other school of thought takes its 
departure from Augustine’s Confessions, from which develops what will become the 
‘phenomenology’ of time: it understands time in terms of the subject’s experience of it passing. 
Ricoeur argues that both approaches bring something essential to our understanding of time, even if 
the two approaches are mutually contradictory and lack internal consistency. In fact, in order to 
maintain their accounts of time, subjective theories repeatedly sneak in ‘objective’ or ‘natural’ 
elements (for example, death in Heidegger). Likewise, the objective accounts of time smuggle in 
subjective notions to prop up their objective accounts of time (notions like before and after, which 
are the very conceptions on which subjective accounts of time depend). The two approaches do thus 
meet undisclosed, all the while denying their secret tryst.  
Between the psychic and the cosmological lies the social (or “human”) experience of temporality 
which is configured and shared by means of narrative. Social time is not held hostage by the aporia 
at the heart of traditional philosophies of time; narrative anchors subjective time in the cosmos and 
provides meaning to objective time; it thereby mediates between these two approaches (and 
dimensions of time) long seen as an exclusively either/or option. Narrative provides the means of 
bringing the two conceptions of time openly into relation to one another. How this can be done is 
Ricoeur’s primary preoccupation in his intricate and challenging three-volume work. 
Ricoeur notes that Homo sapiens seem to have an innate capacity for narrative. Narrative has been a 
feature of every known culture, at every known point in history; it and plays a vital role in the 
development, and self-understanding, of both individuals and collectives.  In coming to terms with 
narrative, Ricoeur constructs a theory on the back of Aristotle’s examination of tragic drama in his 
Poetics (2013). Ricoeur argues that the classical philosopher’s conception of tragedy is sufficiently 
general to provide the basis of a theory of all narratives, and not just tragedies3.  A narrative is above 
all a form of discourse with a beginning, a middle, and an end.  While we can call this structure the 
‘plot’ of the narrative, Ricoeur is much more interested in the activity of making plots, or as he calls 
it, ‘emplotment’, which is his translation of Aristotle’s muthos; consonant with much of 
contemporary sociology, his emphasis is less on structure than on structuration (1984: 48).  
A narrative emplots or configures events into a sequence, which makes them into an “intelligible 
whole” (Ricoeur, 1984:65). Events are arranged events in a chronology, first “then”,  “and then” and 
so forth, “in accord with the irreversible order of time common to physical and human events” (67). 
Events follow one another, and characters develop, not just in a sequence, but into a meaningful and 
intelligible sequence, into a story that a reader or hearer can follow, guided by cultural expectations 
and genres.  A narrator shapes sequence of “one thing after another” in conjunction with the 
expectations of the audience, whereby it becomes “one thing because of another” (Dowling, 2011: 
5). For this reason, a narrative always entails a causal chain (explicit or implied) between events; 
events that do not figure in the development of the plot, or show the development of the 
                                                          
3 Aristotle only knew three narrative genres: tragedy, comedy, and the epic. 
characters, need to be edited-out or else refigured so that they do.  Causal relationships between 
events, and their effects on characters that act and suffer the actions of others, must be “probable” 
(to use Aristotle’s terms), or in less technical terms, they must be plausible and cohere with our 
expectations of how the world works.   
Following Aristotle’s theory of narrative, Ricoeur argues that narratives entail “discordant 
concordance”.  Discordance, such as meaningless, unmerited, suffering brings chaos and anomie; 
these are made “concordant” as they are integrated into the arc of the plot, and resolved, or at least 
made meaningful.  In this context, Ricoeur draws our attention to a key term in Aristotle’s discussion 
of complex tragedies, such as Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex: peripeteia. In Aristotle’s Poetics, peripeteia, 
(“strokes of fate, terrifying and pitiful events, a profound error” (1991b: 32), designates is the key 
problem to be resolved or given meaning in the course of a tragic narrative plot. In this sense, one of 
the functions of narrative is precisely how some authors have understood religion, as a “sacred 
canopy” that shields humans from disorder, anomie and meaninglessness (Berger, 1969). Thus, one 
could argue that even profane stories take on a religious role insofar as they order the world. 
Life and the stories that we tell about life exist in a reciprocal or dialectical relationship with one 
another.  Ricoeur argues that human life and action is inescapably symbolic, and each of us is shaped 
by the stories we have heard from a young age—children learn much of what they know of the 
world early on, from stories.  Narrative—be it fictional, historical, sociological— is assembled from 
the raw material of life. Narrative is mimetic, which for Ricoeur means not simply mean that art 
‘imitates’ life; rather, Ricoeur stresses the active, creative, structuration of emplotment that shapes 
life into story. Nevertheless, narrative and life remain tethered to one another. Thus, the dialectic. 
We can only understand stories because of “our familiarity with the conceptual network of human 
acting that is of the same order as the familiarity we have with the plots of stories that are known to 
us” (Ricoeur, 1991b: 28). At the same time, stories we have appropriated shape our understanding 
of the world and our action within it.    
Narratives order experience, but historical narratives (as opposed to fictional narratives4) do so in 
conjunction with three primary “bridges” that facilitate the connection between the 
phenomenological and cosmological between the “time of the soul” and the “time of the world”.   
The bridges that Ricoeur has identified allow narrative to stitch together the self’s relationship with 
the cosmos are 1) the calendar 2) the sequence of generations and 3) the “trace”.    
Ricoeur’s thinking about the calendar draws very heavily on Emil Benveniste’s essay “Le language et 
l’expérience humaine”. Ricoeur uses this article as the basis for his argument that the technology of 
the calendar provides the means for the development of “chronicle time” which connects everyday 
experience to the movement of the sun, moon and planets. Three features of the calendar stand out 
in particular: 1) calendars begin with a culturally significant point of origin: the birth of Christ or the 
Buddha, Muhammed’s departure from Mecca to Medina, or the creation of the world in the Jewish 
                                                          
4 Ricoeur is as interested in fiction as in history, and in fact the whole of volume two is concerned primarily 
with fictional narratives, which provide a “laboratory” for thinking about time (and ethics) precisely because of 
their looser connection to the time of the world. My reason for focusing on historical narratives is because, 
although these are by no means less important than historical narratives, the direction of thought Ricoeur 
pursues by thinking about and with fiction is at some remove from the comparison and conversation with 
Durkheim that I am developing here. 
calendar.  2) the founding event provides a point along which an axis stretches through the present 
and into the future; this allows every event in human history to be dated (at least in theory). Finally,  
3) Astronomy allows the determination (if not, Ricoeur adds, the enumeration) of time by dividing 
that time into intervals. Calendar time thus “borrows from physical time” (1988: 107)  
The sequence of generations provides another “bridge” between the subjective experience of time 
and the natural world, this time the link is with biology, rather than with astronomy. This Ricoeur 
develops in dialogue with Martin Heidegger, who understood humans as distinctively “beings unto 
death”.  Ricoeur does not share Heidegger’s neo-stoicism, but he does see the idea of a generation 
as “expressing brute facts about human biology: birth, aging and death” (110), but it also allows us 
to live as contemporaries in a world bequeathed to us by our forbearers, and which we pass on to 
our children and to our children’s children.  The journey of a single generation, from birth, ageing, 
reproduction, and death, forms the basis of the individual’s biography.  
Ricoeur sought to learn about narrative and time from historians, translating the objects of their 
practices into philosophical terms when he discusses “traces” or “marks”:  
The trace is one of the more enigmatic instruments by means of which historical narrative 
“refigures” time.  It refigures time by constructing the junction brought about by the 
overlapping of the existential and the empirical in the significance of the trace…With regard 
to traces [historians] stand in a relationship of usage. It is in frequenting archives and 
consulting documents that historians look for the trace of the past as it really occurred. The 
problem of what the trace as such signifies is not the historian’s but the philosopher’s.    
 Traces are those marks left in the past that have a presence in the future; while they may be 
documents organised into an archive, they may be anything that someone, or something, has done 
in the past that leaves behind a vestige of some sort. Traces may be texts, but they may be almost 
anything left behind in the past and waiting to be rediscovered: buildings, but also detritus found in 
an archaeologist’s digs: what remains of the buildings, tools, and above all, the rubbish, of people 
who have themselves long since stopped making their mark on the world. They become the building 
blocks of the professional historian’s reconstruction and interpretation of the past, but form the 
environment in which we dwell. People “make history, but not in conditions of their own choosing”, 
said Marx; those conditions are comprised in part of marks left by our forbearers. 
Bridging from Durkheim to Ricoeur?  
Durkheim’s and Ricoeur positions are without a doubt mutually exclusive. Durkheim permits no 
place for narrative in the constitution of time (this being fully accounted for by ritual practices); 
Ricoeur countenances little role for ritual in the experience of time, making only a partial exception 
for “mythic time” (discussed below).  There are nevertheless several points of convergence, of which 
the calendar is the most significant.  Further, ritual and narrative are not phenomena hermetically 
sealed off from one another; they are mutually imbricated, as the calendar, which we will discuss 
below, itself testifies. Narratives are very often enacted ritually, rituals are used to perform 
narrative, to bring them alive and give them social presence.  While Durkheim and Ricoeur’s theories 
may not be readily harmonised, the recognition that the key elements of their respective 
explanations of social time, ritual and narrative are intertwined brings the theories into a relation 
with one another. 
Ricoeur leaves very little room for the ritual action that configures “human” or “social” time, though 
he is happy to acknowledge that in elementary forms of social organisation, such as those Durkheim 
studied, which he refers to as “mythic time,” is organised around the ritual year. “Indeed”, he goes 
on to acknowledge,  
it is through the mediation of ritual that mythic time is revealed to be the common root of 
world time and human time. Through its periodicity, a ritual expresses a time whose 
rhythms are broader than those of ordinary action. By punctuating action in this way, it sets 
ordinary time and each brief human life within a broader time (1988: 105). 
The implications, however, are not explored in Ricoeur’s three volume work, nor does he give due 
consideration to the role of ritual in the development of modern society’s experience of time.  
Nevertheless, of Ricoeur’s three “bridges” that cross over between the psyche’s experience of time 
and the objective time of the cosmos making historical narratives possible, calendars (and, as I will 
suggest, clocks) have clear links to ritual. The movement and passing of generations are likewise 
marked ritually. Furthermore, ritual and narrative are themselves much more intimately 
interconnected than either Durkheim or Ricoeur would like to admit.  
Ricoeur does observe that the origin point of calendrical systems is usually a religiously narrated 
event. This becomes one point on an axis in relation to which all events thereafter are marked in 
time. The most obvious examples are the birth of Christ, the Buddha, and Guru Nanak, or the 
departure of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina, or the creation of the world in the Hebrew 
calendar. It is not just the point of origin for the calendar that matters, however; rather, as Durkheim 
argued, the periodicity of the annual calendar is typically also organised around sacred rites to be 
performed on particular days of the year.  This means that the starting point of social time may lie in 
mythical time (as Ricoeur acknowledges), but the very units against which distance from that point,  
for most of the history of the west at least, was the liturgical calendar, with Its feasts and saint’s 
days, and the stories that accompany them (Zerubavel, 1981). The naming of weeks in relation to the 
rituals and narratives of Christmas, Easter and Pentecost has largely passed out of common daily 
usage except in the few universities that maintain the tradition (Oxford, Cambridge, St Andrew’s in 
Scotland and Trinity College Dublin, for example, use different names for their terms, but all are 
based on the liturgical year).  Christmas and Easter, however, nevertheless remain significant in the 
organisation of the year. Christmas and Easter may have become for most capitalist, rather than 
Christian, feasts, but they continue to make their mark on the organisation of the year, and 
observable as key moments of the annual business cycle. 
Ricoeur argued that the periodicity of the calendar connects the psyche’s experience of time with 
the movements of the cosmos; Durkheim, by contrast thought that this was entirely secondary, 
conventional, and for the most part, irrelevant.  Either the one or the other can be correct, 
depending on which calendrical marker one considers.  Some of the calendar’s markers are tied to 
the movement of the sun, moon and stars, others are not; but all have all been constructed and 
marked liturgically. The day/night sequence and the 365¼ day year with its regular seasons, its 
equinoxes and solstices, are based on the movement of the planet and its relation to the sun. Some 
calendrical systems base their months on the waxing and waning of the moon, though this does not 
correspond to the solar calendar. As a result, some religious festivals, like Passover, Easter, or 
Ramadan are inserted into the later, Roman based, solar calendar on the basis of calculations from 
the a lunar calendar (Muir, 2005).   
There is nothing “natural” about the division of the year into weeks, or the grouping of days into 
weeks (depending from which end you start). Different cultures have had various and sundry 
systems of grouping days, and with different numbers of days making up a week (Richards, 2000). 
The Jewish tradition gave us the seven-day week, with its cycle of six profane days, followed by its 
sacred day, the Sabbath. Christians and Muslims both appropriated this seven-day week, though 
distinguished themselves by choosing a different day and setting it apart as sacred. Christians first 
moved their holy day, romanising it and setting it apart from Jewish practice by choosing Sunday; 
Muslims chose Friday in order to distinguish themselves from their monotheistic kin (Zerubavel, 
1981).  
Durkheim could have made a stronger case for the  social origin of the conceptual framework by 
which we experience time by examining of how day/night are divided into smaller segments, though 
this would have been difficult to do within the confines of his study of an “elementary” society and 
its elementary forms.  While we have come to take for granted that the day is marked by twenty-
four hours, the day/night whole is divisible by any denominator (and has been divided variously in 
different cultures, Richards, 2000). To mark the hours requires sophisticated technology; the sundial 
being the most effective before the development of mechanical clocks—at least during daylight 
hours.  But these were long what is known as “unequal hours”.  Extrapolating from the movement of 
the sun across the sky, the time of daylight was divided into twelve equal parts, with no adjustments 
being made whether it was winter with its short daytime or summer with its long daytime. Thus, in 
the regime of unequal hours, one could accomplish twice as much in a summer hour than in a winter 
hour, at least Northern Europe. Until sufficiently accurate mechanical clocks made the division of the 
day and night into “equal hours”, the idea, which had long existed, was unrealised (Glennie and 
Thrift, 2009).     
While technology made the division of equal hours possible, the impetus to divide the day accurately 
came in the first instance from the church—the bells (clocca, or ‘clock’) of the church which rang in 
the cities and towns to announce, above all, the beginning of mass.  Even more important for its 
long-term consequences was the precisely scheduled lives of religious orders.  Much of the impetus 
for a regime of time that would enable coordinated action amongst a sizeable a group of people, 
came from the Benedictines. The variation in the length of time between the unequal hours made 
the orderly life they sought to lead, with prayers offered at appointed “hours”, and every task in 
between done at its “anointed” time, challenging to say the least. The first mechanical clocks 
functioned as alarm clocks that alerted the sacrist to ring the bells for the earliest (before daylight) 
prayers, and they gradually assisted the shift to the more regular, equal hours. We derive not only 
our precisely scheduled, intricately coordinated lives from the religious orders, but the 24 units into 
which our days are carved: horarium was the name for the monks’ schedule of daily activities 
(Zerubavel, 1981; Glennie and Thrift, 2009).  
The connection between Ricoeur’s notion of the generation as a bridge between the time of the soul 
and the time of the world (in this case, biological, rather than cosmological) needs to be mentioned 
briefly, as well. While one could argue that the processes of birth, growth, reproduction and death 
are “natural” processes of the world, the “generation” is not. The conception of the generation is 
maintained through some of the most universally ritualised activities known to humankind. Birth, 
the introduction to adulthood, marriage, the naming of children and grandchildren, and then death, 
are typically marked ritually. Whatever the problems with the concept of generation (Kertzer, 1983), 
there is little doubt that it is these markings, not only the biology of birth, growth, reproduction and 
decline, on which the concept of generation is built, and by which it is maintained liturgically 
(Rappaport, 1999) and remembered in narrative.  
Whatever the branch of Christian tradition, and whether it refers to its central ritual as The Mass, as 
Holy Communion, or as The Lord’s Supper, every time this Christian celebration is administered, 
ritual and narrative are intertwined. Thus, to take one example, according to the rite found in The 
Book of Common Prayer, ordered for use in the Church of England, and elsewhere, for more than 
three hundred years, the priest says:  
Hear us, O merciful Father, we most humbly beseech thee; and grant that we receiving these 
thy creatures of bread and wine, according to thy son our Saviour Jesus Christ’s holy 
institution, in remembrance of his death and passion, may be partakers of his most blessed 
Body and blood: who, in the same night that he was betrayed took Bread; and when he had 
given thanks, he brake it, and gave it to his disciples, saying Take, eat; this is my Body which 
is given for you; Do this in remembrance of me…(“Lord’s Supper or Holy Communion”, Book 
of Common Prayer (1662))  
The biblical narrative of Jesus’s last supper with his disciples, which is always integrated into the 
ritual, becomes the model and provides the framework for the ritual.  And while this is not the only 
time that this narrative is told, it is undoubtedly told most frequently in this fashion.  This ritual 
repetition of the story, in some traditions celebrated multiple times every week, becomes the 
primary means of maintaining it as a live story, for consuming it, embodying it, along with the bread 
and wine. Which, then, is it? A story, or a ritual? In this example, the two elements are inseparable. 
 Behind the Christian Mass, lies another ritual-story-meal, celebrated by Jesus and his disciplines. 
Celebrated annually by Jews, the Passover Seder is a meal where the different foods on the plate 
represent parts of the story; the key ingredients are explicated in response to the questions children. 
Here again, the story is literally eaten, the ritual enacts a story told through food consumed, but it is 
explicitly linked to the transmission of the very essence of Jewish tradition from one generation to 
the next generation. Thus, in his commentary on the Passsover Haggadah, Elie Wiesel explains that 
the imperative of the Passover Haggadah, to tell the story of the Exodus, when God freed the Jews 
from Pharoah’s bondage,  
expresses the essence of Jewish faith, of Jewish allegiance to a collective memory. It is as 
though we had all been in Egypt together, prisoners of the same enemy, suffering the same 
pain, the same anguish… (2006: 27).  
But the ritual meal, which assigns roles to the children to ask questions, carries the imperative to 
pass this story on to the next generation: “and you shall tell your son on that day” (34).   
In order to find convergence between Durkheim and Ricoeur, one need not argue that all rituals 
convey a story, nor that all narratives become ritualised.  In both the example of the Christian Mass 
and the Passover Seder, the elements of the ritual-narratives are like conjoined twins that share a 
heart.   Some might argue that what really matters is the ritual, or else, that what is vital is the 
narrative.  If, however, we were to extract the narrative from the ritual, in the case of either the 
Jewish memorial of the exodus, or the Christian remembrance of the crucifixion, the ritual seems to 
lose its stated purpose: the remembrance and re-enactment of the story.  On the other hand, if one 
were to attempt to extract the ritual from the narrative, leaving only the story, the story itself would 
lose its means of being told, and of being embodied,  as well as its means of being passed on to a 
subsequent generation; each new generation learns the narrative by consuming it in a ritual meal.  
 
Conclusion 
Sociologists and other scholars have not often considered ritual and narrative together; indeed, they 
have tended to subsume the one into the other, or else to treat the one as a derivative of the other 
(Ryan 2013). Particularly given the dearth of research and theory at the intersection of ritual studies 
and narratology (Nünning and Nünning, 2013), a conversation between Ricoeur and Durkheim—
these two dialogue partners that at first glance would not seem not well disposed to one another—
has much to offer, and needs to be taken up in earnest.  While their respective theories of “social 
time” cannot be easily synthesised, it has been possible to construct several “bridges” (to use one of 
Ricoeur’s favourite terms) between the two. While the two theories may be incommensurable, if we 
look at the relationship between ritual and narrative, we find that the two phenomena are, at least 
in some key instances, themselves impossible to separate. Narratives about the past depend on the 
calendar on the concept of the generation to provide a structure for, and a way of marking, the flow 
of time. And yet, while these may themselves bridge ‘natural time’ and ‘experiential time’, the way 
that they do so are themselves highly ritualised constructions, and derive from the liturgical 
practices of the past, if not also the present.  Conversely, ritual practices often act as carriers of 
narrative, and providing for the transmission of narratives from generation to generation.    
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